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Metaphoric Worlds: Conceptions of a Romantic Nature, by
Samuel R. Levin; xv & 250 pp. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1988, $26.50.
Samuel R. Levin's Metaphoric Worlds is an ambitious book. The author pro-
poses a controversial theory ofmetaphor motivated by a bold reading ofWords-
worth's poetry but his theory sometimes falls short of the poetry it is designed
to explicate. His respect for Wordsworth, however, redeems these occasional
lapses.
Levin sketches his theory of metaphor in the first six chapters of the book.
By metaphors he means "expressions that evince a degree of linguistic deviance
in their composition" (p. 1): "the trees were weeping" and "the sea was laughing"
are two of his examples. These statements deviate from "ordinary expressions"
in making claims that sound false and even ridiculous when measured against
everyday experience. A common-sense view of metaphors adjusts them to the
familiar world that they seem to defy. "The trees were weeping" thus really
means that they were dripping sap. Instead of salvaging metaphors this way,
Levin proposes taking them literally, which for him means reconceiving the
world to fit them rather than fitting them to the world.
Taken literally, "the trees were weeping" challenges us to conceive of a world
where trees as well as people can feel. According to Levin, "in any such effort
[to conceive of this world] no definite understanding of that state of affairs [in
which trees weep] can be produced" (p. 21). But by straining against the limits
of the given world, we as readers reenact "the poet's struggle against limitations
inherent in the capacities of human language" (p. 3). Language is limited in
that terms describing mental and affective states primarily apply to humans
(see pp. 93-94, 137—38). Because "the language at our disposal, for all its utility
and excellence, is, for the expression of certain profound and out-of-the-
ordinary experiences, an inadequate vehicle," Levin concludes that "it is only
by taking [the poet's] metaphors literally that we stand a chance of approaching
an understanding of the thoughts and emotions the poet is striving to com-
municate" (p. 3).
Levin differentiates his view ofmetaphor from the approach of several other
theorists, among them Lakoff and Johnson, Donald Davidson, Paul Ricoeur,
Edmund Husserl, Giambattista Vico, and Thomas Aquinas. He also considers
the complex truth of metaphors. We can never fill in the conceptual space
opened when we take metaphors literally—unlike a scientific discovery, "the
trees were weeping" is not a fact and never will be. But trying to redraw the
world along the lines of metaphors nevertheless results in knowledge—"knowl-
edge of our own capacities to be sure, but knowledge nonetheless" (p. 99).
Levin's analysis raises several questions, many of them deriving from the
conclusion that his oudook on metaphors pays off in a deeper understanding
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of Romantic poetry, especially Wordsworth's, the source of one of Levin's
examples ("The sea was laughing," Prelude, IV, 326). I admire Levin's refusal
to soften Wordsworth's demands on his readers. Wordsworth does challenge
us to take his metaphors at face value and thus conceive of an animated world
with murmuring rivers, laughing seas, and breathing mountains. But I would
resist opposing this world to "the ordinary world" (p. 236) and making its
expression depend on "deviant" statements accessible only to an "elected few"
(p. 235). Picturing Wordsworth's achievement this rarefied way clashes with his
repeated commitment to everyday language, common people, and "the actual
world ofour familiar days" (Prelude, XIII, 357). Wordsworth dares us not simply
to conceive of his world but to make it the "simple produce of the common
day" (Prospectus to TL· Excursion, 55). In thus contesting what we regard as
"ordinary" (or "deviant"), Wordsworth may be evenmore audacious than Levin's
sympathetic account supposes.
University of NewMexicoMichael Fischer
The Literature of Guiltfrom Gulliver to Golding, by Patrick
Reilly, viii & 178 pp. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press,
1988, $18.00.
In his introduction, Professor Reilly oudines the modern repudiation of
nineteenth-century redemptive mythology. "We live in the time of the dark
epiphany" (pp. 12-13). He pursues this negative epiphany in Heart ofDarkness,
Death in Venice, Nineteen Eighty-Four, and Lord of tL· Flies.
Some of the basic generalizations are intriguing but porous. "The redemptive
mythology, whether religious or secularized, favoured by the nineteenth century
excluded the idea of the doomed culprit . . . the man sundered from grace,
who, wanting to pray, cannot" (p. 2). Possible exceptions spring to mind: Dos-
toyevsky, Buder, Twain. "The literature of our time is attuned to hell; it is the
heavenly chord that jars" (p. 7). Well, what about Eliot, Tate, Faulkner, and
others?
The experience of reading this book is one of alternating from nodding in
assent, to groaning, then hanging suspended in dubiety, now and dien shaking
off ideas like bothersome insects. This is not meant as disparagement, for this
is a more vibrant experience than plodding through academic aridities ofnarrow
definitions propped upon "hard" evidence.
As to nodding in assent: in spite of the difficulty of delivering anything new
on Swift, Professor Reilly's discussion reveals fresh aspects of Swift's detestation
of fashionable doctrines that preached the exculpation of man. When Swift is
